Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan by Abbadi, Sinan S et al.
Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 4 
2016 
Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: 
Evidence from Jordan 
Sinan S. Abbadi 
BAU Business School, Al- Balqa' Applied University (BAU), Jordan, sinan@bau.edu.jo 
Qutaiba F. Hijazi 
General Budget Dept., Ministry of Finance, Jordan, qutaiba.hijazi@gbd.gov.jo 
Ayat S. Al-Rahahleh 
Jordan Securities Commission, Jordan, ayat.rahahleh@jsc.gov.jo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj 
Copyright ©2016 Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal and Authors. 
Recommended Citation 
Abbadi, Sinan S.; Hijazi, Qutaiba F.; and Al-Rahahleh, Ayat S., Corporate Governance Quality and 
Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan, Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance 
Journal, 10(2), 2016, 54-75. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v10i2.4 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance quality on earnings management in Jordan. 
Using a panel data set of all industrial and service firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during 
the period 2009-2013; this paper provides evidence that earnings management is affected negatively by 
corporate governance quality. In particular; the results show that earnings management is affected 
negatively by overall categories of governance index represented by board of director, board meeting, 
Audit and nomination and compensation committee. Furthermore, results suggest that corporate 
governance quality has increased over time. Thus, its ability to constrain earnings management has also 
increased. It is recommended to industrial and service companies to boost their compliance with 
corporate governance code to improve the integrity and reliability of financial reports. This paper fills a 
gap in the literature by providing evidence about the effect of corporate governance quality on earnings 
management in Jordan as an emerging economy. 
Keywords 
Corporate governance quality, earnings management, financial reporting 
This article is available in Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj/vol10/
iss2/4 
 Corporate Governance Quality 
and Earnings Management: Evidence from 
Jordan 
 
Sinan S. Abbadi1, Qutaiba F. Hijazi
2
 and Ayat S. Al-Rahahleh
3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance quality on earnings management in 
Jordan. Using a panel data set of all industrial and service firms listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) during the period 2009-2013; this paper provides evidence that earnings 
management is affected negatively by corporate governance quality. In particular; the results 
show that earnings management is affected negatively by overall categories of governance index 
represented by board of director, board meeting, Audit and nomination and compensation 
committee. Furthermore, results suggest that corporate governance quality has increased over 
time. Thus, its ability to constrain earnings management has also increased. It is recommended to 
industrial and service companies to boost their compliance with corporate governance code to 
improve the integrity and reliability of financial reports. This paper fills a gap in the literature by 
providing evidence about the effect of corporate governance quality on earnings management in 
Jordan as an emerging economy. 
 
JEL Classification: M40 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance quality, earnings management, financial reporting 
  
                                                          
1
 Associate Professor, BAU Business School, Al- Balqa' Applied University (BAU), Jordan. Sinan@bau.edu.jo 
2
 Budget Analyst, General Budget Dept., Ministry of Finance, Jordan. Qutaiba.Hijazi@gbd.gov.jo 
3
 Securities Analyst, Jordan Securities Commission, Jordan. Ayat.rahahleh@jsc.gov.jo 
 Abbadi, Hijazi & Al-rahahleh | Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Jordan 
  
55 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality on the 
practice of earnings management through discretionary accruals in Jordan. The motivation of this 
research comes from the global attention to corporate governance quality as well as Earning 
Management.  
 
Previous research reported that management may resort to accounting choices that increase 
income to conceal poor performance (Campello et al., 2011; Habib et al., 2013). Moreover, 
Management can take advantage of the flexibility of both IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards) and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) in choosing 
among different accounting methods when computing earnings and other financial measures of 
performance, which could lead to reduce quality of financial reports (Makar et al., 2000). 
 Previous research (references for this?) conducted in Jordan has tackled the issues of Corporate 
Governance and Earnings Management. However, less attention has been paid to the linkage 
between corporate governance quality and earnings management. The current study fills this gap 
in the literature by providing evidence about the effect of corporate governance quality on 
earnings management in Jordan. Therefore, this research is driven by the role of corporate 
governance quality in maintaining financial statement users’ confidence in the integrity of 
financial reports. 
 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss the motivation 
of the anticipated relationship between corporate governance quality and earnings management. 
In section three we review the related literature. In section four we introduce the sample selection 
and research methodology. Section five reports the empirical results and conclusions of the 
study. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance is defined as the relationship among the corporation and all of its 
stakeholders (Arsoy & Crowther, 2008), and as “a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders”, (La Porta et al. 1997). 
Corporate governance initially appeared to minimise conflict of interest between management 
and shareholders given the separation between ownership and control, (Baydoun, et al., 2012). 
The agency framework indicates that internal monitoring mechanisms assist to confirm that 
directors carry out policies that maximize shareholders’ wealth where these mechanisms include 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, separation of the chairman and chief 
executive posts and the establishment of board subcommittees. 
 
 According to several authors (Cadbury, 1992; Dahya & Travlos, 2000; Weir & Laing, 2001) 
duality takes place when the chairman of the board and CEO roles are combined. The chairman 
of the board is responsible for managing the board. However, the CEO is responsible for day-to-
day management of the firm, including the enforcement of board decisions. Therefore, firms that 
have duality may have a powerful individual who has the ability to make decisions that may not 
maximize shareholders’ wealth. Consequently, the chairman and CEO roles should be separated. 
Moreover, stewardship theory considers that CEO duality could enhance a unified and strong 
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leadership instead of weakening the independence of the board from management as well its 
monitoring role (Sheikh, et al., 2013; Al-rahahleh, 2015).  
 
The audit committee is responsible for the external auditing of the firm financial statements. Due 
to the existence of remuneration and audit committees monitor of board performance, it is 
expected that board will be motivated to improve performance, and investors will gain more 
confidence in the value of firm’s financial statement (Laing & Weir, 1999). According to 
(Ruigrok, Peck et al. 2006) the presence of a nomination committee
4
 is expected to improve the 
quality of financial statements through ensuring that each nominated director has the required 
skills and experience.  Furthermore, Adams (2000) suggests that the frequency of board meetings 
is an important mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of board performance to their duties which 
includes overseeing the behavior of the managers. 
 
2.2. Earnings management 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide a comprehensive definition: “Earnings management occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”. Fischer and Rosensweig (1995) define earnings management as: 
“Actions by division managers which serve to increase (decrease) current reported earnings of a 
division without a corresponding increase (decrease) of the long-term economic profitability of 
the division.” As such, this definition identifies two important components of earnings 
management: consequences and intent.  
 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gajevszky, 2014) argued that the manipulation 
of accounting figures as an outcome of ordinary operational practices appears to arise from 
management’s motivation to mislead shareholders to ensure that the organization's financial 
targets have been met in the course of business. Due to the information asymmetry which exists 
between the company`s insiders and outsiders, individuals within an organization can rely on 
their control in financial reporting and their access to financial information within the company 
to overstate the income or to mask obtaining unfavorable results. From this viewpoint, 
management may use different methods such as hiding the changes in economic performance by 
creating reserves for future periods, hence reducing income volatility (Leuz et al., 2003; Hijazi & 
Al-Thuneibat, 2015).  
 
Managers can opportunistically manipulate accounting reports by managing accruals. However, 
Kaplan (1985) state that "normal" accruals arising in the ordinary course of business are unlikely 
to reflect managerial opportunistic behavior. Any manipulation of accounting information will 
most likely be apparent in "abnormal" accruals. 
                                                          
4
 The Nominations and Compensations Committee  main tasks are: 
1. Ensuring the independence of independent members on a continuous basis. 
2. Setting the policy of compensations, privileges, incentives, and salaries and to review them on a yearly basis. 
3. Defining the company's needs of qualifications at the upper executive management and employees levels, and the 
criteria for their selection. 
4. Drawing the company’s human resources and training policy, monitoring its implementation, and reviewing it on 
an annual basis 
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Dechow et al., (1995) examined various models to separate total accruals into normal and 
abnormal components. They conclude that the Modified Jones Model is the most effective in 
identifying abnormal accruals that likely reflect earnings management. 
 
2.3. The relation between corporate governance and earnings management  
 
Board governance can directly affect managers’ decisions and activities, and can influence 
choosing, hiring, and controlling external auditors and internal control mechanisms through the 
audit committee. Although, better board governance can use the internal control system to 
monitoring opportunistic earnings management (Brickley et al., 1994; Klein, 2002; Carcelloet 
al., 2006). Prior literature has documented how board independence can constrain earnings 
management (Dechow&Dichev, 2002) due to independent directors do not seek self-interests 
such as executive compensation, the fraudulent of assets and delude investors to meet personal 
objectives.  
 
Williamson (1981) debated that the independence of the board is necessary to oversight 
managerial activities to maintain the interest of investors. Roe (1991) points out that Board 
independence can prohibit managers’ abuse of power. Similarly, Beasley (1996) observed that 
the inclusion of a large number of outside directors on the board could decrease the probability 
of manager’s opportunistic behavior. Peasnell et al., (2005) supports this view by arguing that a 
higher percentage of outside directors in the UK can better prevent income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to avert earnings management. Likewise, Klein (2002) supports this view 
by arguing that a negative relationship between board independence and earnings management 
exists in the US. Correspondingly, Xie et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between board 
independence and the extent of earnings management. 
 
Bedard et al (2004) also observed that audit committees with financial expertise in the US can 
prohibit earnings management. Further, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) point out that audit 
expertise can prevent fraud and manipulating earnings, which are measures that affect earnings 
management. Gaver and Gaver (1998) found a significant and positive association between cash 
compensation and earnings only if those earnings are positive. Baber et al. (1998) supports this 
view by arguing that firms with higher compensation function have more persistent components 
of earnings. Cheng (2004) depicted a significant positive relation between changes in option 
compensation and changes in R&D expenditures as the executive’s terminal year approaches. 
Moreover, Huson et al (2012) and Man and Wong (2013) observed evidence that the 
compensation committee makes decisions related to discretionary expenditure in the executive’s 
terminal year when setting cash compensation for executives, and intervenes to minimize 
payments when managers make up accruals. 
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3. Previous Research 
 
Previous researchers have documented that the influence of the role of corporate governance on 
earnings management is noteworthy in the sense that a high quality of corporate governance 
limits earnings management practices. However, previous research has reported mixed results 
about the nature of this relationship. Klein (2002) found that firms with boards and/or audit 
committees composed of independent directors are less likely to have large abnormal accruals. 
The study also suggests that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more 
effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. Liu and Lu (2007) indicated 
that good corporate governance mitigates agency problems, especially agency conflicts between 
the largest shareholders and the minority shareholders. In other words, firms with higher 
corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. Ali Shah et al., (2009) 
reported similar results i.e. there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings management. 
 
Epps and Ismail (2009) pointed out that firms with annually elected boards, small size boards, 
100 percent independent nominating committees, and 100 percent independent compensation 
committees have more negative discretionary accruals. Ghosh et al., (2010) reported that 
earnings management does not vary with board composition and structure, or with audit 
committee composition, expertise, and ownership. In contrast, board size and audit committee 
size, activity, and tenure are associated with earnings management. Abed et al., (2012) found that 
the size of board of directors is the only variable among the existence of independence members 
within the board of directors, the size of the board of directors, the role duality (CEO/chairman), 
the percentage of insider ownership that has a significant relation with earnings management. Liu 
et al (2013) suggested that independence of audit committee, the frequency of meetings and the 
presence of nomination committee are negatively related to earnings management. However, the 
independence of the board and firm size are positively related to earnings management. 
 
Swastika’s (2013) results showed a significant and negative relationship between audit quality 
and firm size on one hand and earnings management on the other, a significant and positive 
relationship between board of director and earnings management. González and García-Meca 
(2014) reported that management ownership, ownership concentration, board activity and board 
size have a negative relationship with earnings management measured by discretionary accruals. 
However, they did not found any statistically significant relation between family ownership, 
institutional ownership, CEO duality, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals.  Likewise, 
Irayaet al., (2015) found that earnings management is negatively related to ownership 
concentration, board size and board independence but positively related to board activity and 
CEO duality. Furthermore, Patrick et al., (2015) findings show that corporate governance 
practices such as the board size, firm size, board independence, and strength of the audit 
committee have significant influence on earnings management practices. Finally, Ramachandran 
et al., (2015) reported that the incentive of earnings management become higher when the 
nomination committee influence directly or indirectly the remuneration committee.  
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4. Research Design And Variables Measurement 
 
4.1. Study sample 
 
The study sample includes all industrial and service companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) for the period from 2009 to 2013. This selection takes into account the most 
recent data available, prior to publication.The total number of industrial and service companies 
listed in ASE in 2013 is 132 companies. Due to insufficient financial data, 11 companies were 
excluded from the analyses. The final number of companies included in the analyses is 121 
companies and 558 firm-year observations after excluding the outliers to avoid the impact of the 
extreme values where outliers were considered top and bottom 1% of the observations on each of 
the study variables. 
 
 
4.2. Variables Measurement 
 
4.2.1  Dependent variable: earnings management 
 
This study uses the cross-sectional modified Jones’ model (Jones, 1991; and Dechow et al., 
1995) to obtain a proxy for discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) 
argued that the modified Jones model is the most powerful model for estimating discretionary 
accruals among the existing models. Based on the above argument, discretionary accruals can be 
measured as follows: 
 
Equation 1: Total accruals as previously mentioned is the difference between earnings and cash 
flows from operating activities 
TACCit = NIit - OCFit…………………………..(1) 
 
Equation 2: equation below is estimated for each firm and fiscal year combination; thus the 
industry specific parameters of the Jones model are estimated as follows: 
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + εit…..(2) 
 
Equation 3: Non-discretionary accruals are measured for each year and fiscal year combination 
using the equation as follows: 
NDACit =â1 (1/TAit-1) + â 2[(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â 3(PPEit/TAit-1)… (3)   
 
Equation 4: The Difference between total accruals and the non-discretionary components of 
accruals is considered as discretionary accruals (DACC) as stated in equation as follows: 
DACCit= TACCit – NDACit …………… (4) 
 
Where: 
TACCit= total accruals for company i in year t 
NIit = net income before extraordinary items for company i in year t 
OCFit = operating cash flows for company i in year t. 
TAit-1 =   Previous year’s total assets  
∆REVit   = change in operating revenues for company i in year t 
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PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment for company i in year t. 
NDACit= non-discretionary accruals for company i in year t 
∆RECit = change in net receivables for company i in year t 
DACCit = discretionary accruals for company i in year t 
α1- α3 = regression parameters. 
εit = error term for company i in year t. 
We use the absolute value because either positive or negative discretionary accruals are 
considered as earnings management behavior (Wartfield et al., 1995; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; 
Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Barth et al. 2008). 
 
4.2.2. The independent variable: corporate governance quality 
 
Corporate governance quality is measured based on governance index that used by (Sawicki, 
2009; Prommin et al., 2012; Prommin et al., 2014) in measuring corporate governance quality. 
We modified it to be consistent with the rules that required by Corporate Governance Code for 
Shareholding Companies Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange where we award one point for 
each standard that is satisfied. The governance index is classified into four categories with a total 
of 10 standards. All the standards are required by corporate governance code for shareholding 
companies listed on the ASE under “compliance or explain” approach except standards 9 which 
is voluntarily adopted. Table 1 (see next page) presents the governance standards that range from 
1 to 10 to indicate the degree of compliance with 10 governance standards. 
 
Also, the table provides the rule on each standard that is required by corporate governance code 
for shareholding companies listed on the ASE.  
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
 
Factors other than corporate governance characteristics may also contribute to earnings 
management which have been used in previous studies and have been associated with earnings 
management and corporate governance. We include the firm size measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the end of year to control for the effects of firm size on accounting 
choice. It is expected that the control system of large firms are more sophisticated than small 
firms. Further, the accounting fraud is less possible in large companies due to the increased 
monitoring by analysts and investors to these companies comparing with small firms that have 
more opportunities to engage in earnings management practices (Richardson, 1990; Lee & Choi, 
2002; Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Prior et al. 2008; González & García-Meca 
2014). Furthermore, it is expected that small companies are more likely motivated to engage in 
earnings management practices to cover their higher marginal cost comparing with large 
companies that enjoy the benefit from economies of scale. Large companies due to their 
advantage from economies of scale are more able to save costs and thus enhance profitability 
(Lin et al. 2009). 
We also include the leverage level variable measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. It is 
expected that companies that have high leverage suffer from excessive risk. Consequently these 
companies are more likely manipulated their earning (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Dechow et al. 
1995; Mohrman, 1996; Balsam et al. 2003)  
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Table 1. corporate governance quality index 
Category  Governance standard Rule in Corporate governance Code 
 
 
 
 
Board of directors 
1)  Member of board of directors 
are not less than five and not more 
than thirteen 
“The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board 
of directors whose members shall be not less than five and 
not more than thirteen” 
2)  One-third of the directors are 
independent directors 
 
“at least one third of the board members are independent 
members.”  
3) Chairman and CEO positions are 
separated 
 
 
“It is not allowed for one person to hold the positions of 
chairman of the board of directors and any executive 
position in the company at the same time” 
 
Board meetings 
4) Disclosure about number of the 
board meetings 
 
“The board of directors shall meet at least once every two 
months, provided that the number of meetings in the fiscal 
year must not be less than six and the number of meetings 
shall be disclosed in the company’s annual report” 5) The number of board meetings is 
not less than six 
 
 
Audit 
6) Existence of Audit Committee The board of directors shall form the following permanent 
committees: 
The Audit Committee that shall undertake the task of 
overseeing and monitoring accounting and internal control 
and auditing activities in the company 
7) Disclosure of frequency of Audit 
Committee meetings 
 
The Committee shall meet regularly, not less than four 
times a year, and minutes of its meetings must be taken 
appropriately 
8) Expertise of Audit Committee . All members of the Audit Committee must have 
knowledge and experience in finance and accounting, and at 
least one of them must have worked previously in 
accounting or finance fields, and that person must have an 
academic or professional certificate in accounting, finance 
or related fields 
9) Engagement of Big 4 auditors 
(PWC, KPMG, E&Y or Deloitte) 
 
The company’s external auditor should: 
A. Possess a valid license to practice the profession. 
B. Be a member of the Jordan Association of Certified 
Public Accountants. 
C. Have practiced the profession on a full time basis for at 
least three consecutive years, after receiving his license to 
practice the auditing profession. 
D. Have in his firm at least one partner or employee who 
must also meet the above- mentioned requirements. 
Nominations and 
Compensations 
10) Existence of Nominations and 
Compensations Committee 
 
The board of directors shall form the following permanent 
committees: 
 
 The Nominations and Compensations Committee, whose 
main tasks are: 
1. Ensuring the independence of independent members on a 
continuous basis. 
2. Setting the policy of compensations, privileges, 
incentives, and salaries and to review them on a yearly 
basis. 
3. Defining the company's needs of qualifications at the 
upper executive management and employees levels, and the 
criteria for their selection. 
4. Drawing the company’s human resources and training 
policy, monitoring its implementation, and reviewing it on 
an annual basis 
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Consistent with (Kothari et al. 2002; Francis & Wang 2004), we include two indicators of firm 
performance as a control variable, the sales growth and return on assets. Sales growth measured 
as the relation of the difference in sales volume and sales of the previous period. It is expected 
that companies that have high sales growth are less likely to be motivated to engage in earnings 
management practices due to their benefit from a strong market share where strong market share 
lead a company to achieve greater scale in its operations and enhances profitability. A company 
will be gaining market share as long as it maximize growth and maximizing growth is a way to 
maximize profit (Wernerfelt, 1986). Companies that have a higher growth rate are less likely to 
engage in earnings management practices (Bowen et al., 2003; Abdularahman& Ali, 2006). On 
the other hand, Matsumoto (2002) indicated that companies that have high growth rate are more 
likely used earnings management. Return on assets (ROA), calculated by dividing net income 
plus interest expense on the average total assets .This suggests that in order to make the firm 
more attractive; managers intend to increase the obtained profit, in other words, manipulate the 
earning upwardly (Kothari et al. 2005; Machuga&Teitel 2007). 
 
4.3. Empirical model 
 
In order to achieve the objective of the study to examine the effect of corporate governance 
quality on the level of earnings management, the empirical form of the model is set out below: 
 
|DACCit| = β0+ β1Governanceit + β2Sizeit + β3 Leverageit + β4 SGit + β5 ROAit + eit 
 
Where: 
β0; intercept;β1, β2, β3, β4, andβ5: represent the coefficients of regression model. 
|DACCit|: the absolute value of discretionary accruals for company i in year t. 
Governanceit: corporate governance quality, which measured through the above governance 
index. 
Sizeit: the firm size for company i in year t. 
Leverageit: represents the financial leverage for company i in year t. 
SGit: sales growth for company i in year t. 
 
5. Analysis and Discussion 
 
5.1.Descriptive statistics 
 
Table (2) provides the results of the descriptive statistics for the study variables regarding 558 
firm- year observations of 121 industrial and service companies listed on ASE during the period 
(2009-2013). As can be observed from Table 2, the governance index ranges from 2 to 10 with 
an average of 5.396 which indicates that the adoption of corporate governance rules by Jordanian 
companies is not ideal. On the other hand, the discretionary accruals ranges from 0.0001 to 0.689 
with an average of 0.0966 which provided evidence that Jordanian companies manipulate their 
results, either by increasing profits to denote a better and higher profitability of the company or, 
on the contrary, reducing them as fiscal strategy aims to pay less taxes and contributions. 
 
The rate of sales growth of these companies varies from -1 to 1.335 with an average of – 0.014 
which indicates that companies within the sample face on average a decrease in sales volume 
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comparing with previous years. Furthermore, return on assets ranges from -43.798% to 36.02% 
with an average of 2.35%, which shows how efficient management is utilizing company’s assets 
to making a profit. The natural logarithm of total assets of these companies varies from 13.06 to 
21.292 with an average of 17.034, and the financial leverage of these companies which showed 
the proportion of company assets that are financed through debt ranges from 0.0002 to 1.029 
with an average of 0.346.  
 
Table2: Descriptive statistics for the study variable. 
Variables Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation 
DACC 0.0001 0.0966 0.689 0.106 
Governance 2 5.396 
10 
1.761 
Size 13.06 17.034 21.292 1.413 
Leverage 0.0002 0.346 1.029 
0.234 
ROA -43.798 2.35 36.02 9.739 
SG -1 -0.014 1.335 0.307 
 
Table 3 depicts the correlation coefficients between the study variables. As presented in table (3) 
there is a significant negative association between governance quality and earnings management. 
This implies that strong corporate governance quality is associated with lower earnings 
management. Control variables represented by size, sales growth and return on asset have a 
significant negative correlation coefficients. However, leverage has a significant positive 
correlation coefficient.  
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are also shown in Table 3; 
which indicate that there are no signs for multicollinearity because correlation among the set of 
explanatory variables are mostly low (less than 0.4). According to (Filed, 2005; Tauringana & 
Arfifa, 2013) multicollinearity problem exists when correlation coefficient is more than .80 or 
.90 
Table3: Correlation Matrix. 
Variables EM Governance Size Leverage ROA SG 
DACC 1      
Governance -0.301** 1     
Size -0.132** 0.133** 1    
Leverage 0.273** -0.08 0.339** 1   
ROA -0.268** 0.138** 0.314** -0.239** 1  
SG -0.141** 0.124** 0.156** -0.044 0.305** 1 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.2.Discussion 
 
Table (4) reports the results of the study model, which aims to examine the effect of corporate 
governance quality on earnings management taking into consideration company size, financial 
leverage, sales growth and return on assets. The results, as summarized in the table, suggest that 
the 19.5% variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, this model is significant with F-statistic value of (28.061) and p=0.000, 
suggesting that the model is statistically valid. 
 
Table 4:  Multiple Regression results for the whole sample (2009-2013). 
Governance 0.000** 
(-6.113) 
Size 0.001** 
(3.423) 
Leverage 0.000** 
(6.339) 
ROA 0.018* 
(-2.366) 
SG 0.287 
(-1.066) 
Constant 0.000 
(6.043) 
Sig. of F 0.000 
Adj-R
2
 0.195 
The table provides OLS regression results for the main regression model of the study regarding 558 firm year 
observations after deleting outliers. The model is:  
|DACCit| = β0+ β1Governanceit + β2Sizeit + β3 Leverageit + β4 SGit + β5 ROAit + eit 
DACC is the discretionary accruals which measured through modified Jones model, Governance is corporate 
governance quality which measured through governance index as shown in Table 1, Size is firm size which 
measured through Lin of total asset, Leverage is financial leverage which measured through proportion of total 
liabilities to total assets, ROA is return on assets ((net incomeit+ interest expenseit)/ average assetsit), SG is sales 
growth ((current year sales-previous year sales)/previous year sales)The numbers in parenthesis are t-value. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
As can be observed from Table 4, earnings management is affected negatively by governance 
quality at a 1% level of significance, which mean that strong corporate governance prevent 
manipulation in earnings. This result is consistent with Liu and Lu (2007) where a negative 
impact of corporate governance on earnings management was observed. However, this finding is 
inconsistent with Ali Shah et al., (2009) who provided evidence that corporate governance has a 
positive impact on earnings management. On one hand, earnings management is also affected 
negatively by firm size at a 1% level of significance, which indicates that large companies are 
less likely to be engaged in earnings management practices. This is may possibly refer to their 
benefit from economies of scale compared with small companies that tend to manipulate earning 
to cover their high marginal cost.  
On the other hand, earnings management is affected positively with financial leverage at 1% 
level of significance, which imply that companies suffer from high debt tend to manipulate 
earnings and distort their financial statements to maintain a margin of safety to the creditors and 
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to avoid debt covenant violation. This results is consistent with Becker et al. (1998) and with 
(Mohrman, 1996; Gu et al., 2005; Hijazi, 2015) who justified this relation by suggesting that 
these companies are more likely motivated to manipulate earnings to maintain their financial 
statements in accordance with their creditor’s requirements and to debt contractual agreements. 
The results also revealed that sales growth is insignificant related to earnings management. 
However, earnings management is affected negatively by return on asset at 5% level of 
significance. Consequently, it can be argued that companies have high return on assets are less 
likely manipulated their earnings. According to (Kothari et al. 2005; Machuga & Teitel 2007) 
managers intend to increase the obtained profit in other word manipulate the earning upwardly to 
make the firm more attractive. 
 
5.3.Categories of governance index 
 
One could argue that earnings management could be associated with only one or two category of 
governance index; to examine this argument and to gain more insights about which category of 
governance index has more impact on earnings management, regression results of each category 
of governance index are  presented in table (5) below:  
 
Table 5: Multiple Regression results for categories of governance index. 
Variables Board of directors Board meetings Audit Nomination and 
compensation 
Governance 0.001** 
(-3.486) 
0.000** 
(-4.117) 
0.000** 
(-4.644) 
0.008** 
(-2.682) 
Size 0.000** 
(-3.748) 
0.000** 
(-4.553) 
0.007** 
(-2.719) 
0.000** 
(-3.797) 
Leverage 0.000** 
(6.659) 
0.000** 
(6.445) 
0.000** 
(6.504) 
0.000** 
(6.875) 
ROA 0.003** 
(-2.949) 
0.028* 
(-2.197) 
0.023* 
(-2.276) 
0.014* 
(-2.474) 
SG 0.151 
(-1.437) 
0.218 
(-1.232) 
0.203 
(-1.273) 
0.141 
(-1.474) 
Constant 0.000 
(6.102) 
0.000 
(6.012) 
0.000 
(4.513) 
0.000 
(5.045) 
Sig. of F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj-R
2
 0.159 0.167 0.173 0.152 
The model is: |DACCit| = β0+ β1Governanceit + β2Sizeit + β3 Leverageit + β4 SGit + β5 ROAit + eit 
The numbers in parenthesis are t-value. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The results pointed out that earnings management is affected negatively by the four governance 
categories, and the four categories is statistically significant at 1% level of significance, which 
imply that strong adoption to overall categories of governance index prevent earnings 
management practices in Jordan.  
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It can be observed from Table 5 that standards regarding audit and board meetings categories 
have higher coefficients comparing with the other categories, which suggest that strong adoption 
to audit standards prevents the distortion of financial statements. This outcome is consistent with 
the findings of several authors (Liu et al, 2013; Swastika, 2013; and Patrick et al., 2015) who 
agreed on the effectiveness of audit standards in constraining the manipulation of earnings. 
Furthermore, the results also indicate that a strong adoption of board meeting standards can also 
prevent earnings management practices. This is consistent with other findings (González 
&García-Meca, 2014). 
 
The results also indicate that strong compliance with standards regarding board of directors 
category
5
 play a role in preventing manipulation of earnings. This outcome agrees with the 
finding of other studies (Klein, 2002; Liu et al, 2013; Iraya et al., 2015; González & García-
Meca, 2014; Patrick et al., 2015; Ghosh et al., 2010; Abed et al., 2012). However, this result 
contradicts the finding of other studies (Swastika, 2013) where a negative relationship was 
observed between the board of directors and earnings management 
 
The existence of nomination and compensation committees also discourages earnings 
management practices. Thus, it can be argued that managers are less likely to manipulate 
earnings where there exists a particular committee that oversees their compensation. However, in 
case of the non-existence of nomination and compensation committees, managers are more 
motivated to manipulate earnings, especially when their compensations are associated with the 
amount of firm earnings. This supports the results of other studies (for example, Epps & Ismail, 
2009; and Liu et al, 2013) in that nomination committees are negatively associated with earnings 
management. 
 
5.4.Corporate governance quality 
 
The awareness of corporate governance in Jordan has been increasing over time, and the 
compliance with the corporate governance code by Jordanian companies is also increasing over 
time. Thus, corporate governance quality increases over time. Thus, we assume that corporate 
governance quality in the latter part of the sample i.e. 2012-2013 is higher than in the earlier part 
of the sample i.e. 2009-2010 taking into consideration that there is no reason to assume that 
earnings management is decreasing over time. We exploit this fact to determine whether the 
increase in the governance quality has a direct impact on earnings management; we distinguish 
the earlier part of the sample from the latter part of the sample by partitioning the full sample 
into two subsamples represented by “Recent year subsample” and “Early year subsample”; these 
subsamples of the full sample is motivated by the results from previous studies which agreed that 
corporate governance quality increased over time (Sawicki 2009; Promminet, al. 2012; Prommin 
et, al. 2014). 
 
                                                          
5
 Board of directors category governance standard entails the following: 
1)  Member of board of directors are not less than five and not more than thirteen 
2)  One-third of the directors are independent directors 
3) Chairman and CEO positions are separated 
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Table 6 depicts the results of the benchmark model which aims to examine the effect of 
corporate governance quality on earnings management without taking into consideration any 
company characteristics, Table (6) also presents the results of the subsamples which 
distinguishes between recent year and early year 
 
Table 6: Multiple Regression results for the full sample and sub-samples based on year  
Variables Benchmark model 
(EM) 
Recent year 2012-
2013 
Early year 2009-2010 
Governance 0.000** 
(-7.433) 
0.000** 
(-5.431) 
0.000** 
(-4.079) 
Constant 0.000 
(14.059) 
0.000 
(9.102) 
0.000 
(8.829) 
F value 55.251 29.501 16.638 
Sig. of F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj-R
2 
0.089 0.122 0.063 
 
Based on the results summarized in table 6, the explanatory power across recent year subsample 
rose from 0.089 to 0.122 and fall across early year subsample to 0.063. The difference between 
the explanatory power across subsamples support our prior expectation in that corporate 
governance quality is increased over time and it ability to constrain earnings management is also 
increased. 
 
5.5.Robustness tests 
 
There are some fundamental assumptions to be fulfilled in order for the OLS regression model to 
be valid. Most important assumptions are (Hair et al., 2010): Multi-collinearity, Outliers and 
Normality 
 
 5.5.1-collinearity (values of variance inflation and tolerance factor) 
 
Despite the fact that the correlation matrix can be used to detect potential multicollinearity 
problems between explanatory variables, the nonexistence of high correlation does not always 
mean that there is no multicollinearity. To deal with this problem, the multicollinearity was 
tested by finding the variance inflation factor values for independent variables relevant to the 
model. The values of the tolerance factor closer to zero and variance inflation factor greater than 
10 will show the presence of multicollinearity in the model (Gujarati, 2009). 
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Table 7: The Collinearity Statistics for the independent and control variables 
Variables 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Governance 0.955 1.047 
Size 0.705 1.418 
Leverage 0.744 1.344 
ROA 0.716 1.397 
SG 0.897 1.115 
 
The tolerance factors (TF), as we can see from table (7), vary from (0.705) to (0.955). Similarly, 
the results of Variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges from 1.047 to 1.418, which shows no signs 
of multicollinearity in the model. 
 
 5.5.2 Outliers 
 
An outlier is a data point distinct or deviant from the rest of the data. The presence of outliers can 
influence results significantly and thus must be considered for treatment (Gujarati, 2009). There 
are several ways to identify outliers. In this study, outliers were identified using Cook’s distance 
measures the difference between the regressions coefficient obtained from the full data and the 
regression coefficients of the sample after removing a case from the estimation process 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). Moreover, any case that has a value of Cook’s distance of more than 
1.0 is considered as a possible outlier as Maindonald and Braun (2010) suggested. Table 8 
reflects the outcome of Cook’s distance calculation. As can be seen from table 8, the maximum 
value for Cook’s distance for the observations is 0.164 according to Maindonald and Braun 
(2010), there are no outliers due to the notion that maximum value of Cook’s distance for the 
(558) firm-year observation is lower than benchmark 1.0. 
 
Table 8: Cook’s Distance. 
  Mean Minimum Maximum St. deviation 
Cook's Distance 0.003 0.000   0.164  0.012 
 
 
5.5.3 Normality 
Normality refers to the shape of data distributions for an individual quantitative data variable and 
its correspondence to the normal distribution. Since the current research examined data from a 
large sample, this condition may not distort the results as significant departure from non-
normality may be negligible for a sample size of 200 or more (Hair et al., 2010). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance quality on earnings management 
controlling for the effect of firm size, financial leverage, sales growth and return on assets, of all 
industrial and service companies listed on ASE during the period (2009-2013). The findings of 
this study indicate that the level of earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals, is 
affected negatively by corporate governance quality. Regarding control variables, the results 
showed that large companies are less likely tend to engage earnings management practices which 
may possibly refer to their benefits  from their economies of scale; companies that have high 
return on assets are less likely to use discretionary accruals; companies that have high leverage 
are more likely to be motivated to use discretionary accruals and restate their financial statements 
(which may possibly suggest that these companies are trying to show a margin of safety to their 
creditors and to avoid debt covenant violation). Sales growth showed a negative significant 
correlation coefficient at the 1% level of significance, however the overall regression results 
showed that sales growth is insignificant related to earnings management. Furthermore, the 
findings also showed that earnings management is affected negatively by overall categories of 
corporate governance index represented by board of directors, board meetings, Audit and 
Nomination and Compensation committees.  
 
The results of descriptive statistics showed that corporate governance quality for companies 
within the sample ranges from 2 to 10, which indicate that some companies within the sample 
violate the rules of corporate governance code. So far Jordanian companies have not yet reached 
the phase of full compliance with the corporate governance code. This may mainly refer to the 
flexibility given to Jordanian companies through the “compliance or explain” approach rather 
than the “compliance or penalties” approach. However, the difference between subsamples from 
recent and early years indicates that the awareness of corporate governance is increasing over 
time and the compliance with the corporate governance code by Jordanian companies is also 
increasing. Consequently, the ability of corporate governance to constrain earnings management 
practices is also increased. 
 
The results of the study have implicit recommendations for Jordanian companies listed on ASE. 
Due to the negative impact of corporate governance quality on earnings management (which 
reflects on the credibility of the financial statements); Jordanian companies should enhance their 
compliance with corporate governance standards related to boards of directors, board meetings, 
audit, nomination and compensation committees.  
 
 
References 
 
Abdul Rahman, R. & F.H.M. Ali 2006, “Board, audit committee, culture and earnings 
management: Malaysian evidence”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol.21, No.7, pp. 783-
804. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686900610680549 
Abed, S., Al-Attar, A., & Suwaidan, M. 2012. Corporate governance and earnings management: 
Jordanian evidence. International Business Research, 5(1), p216. 
AABFJ  |  Volume 10, no. 2, 2016 
70 
Adams, Renee B., 2000, "The Dual Role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of 
Management: Theory and Evidence.” Previously titled "The Dual Role of Corporate 
Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management," http://ssrn.com/abstract=241581 
From the Social Sciences Research Network Website. 
Agrawal, A. & Chadha, S. 2005. Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 43(2) 371-406. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/430808 
Albrecth, W.D. & F.M. Richardson, 1990.Income smoothing by economy sector. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 17(5): 713−730. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1990.tb00569.x 
Ali Shah, S. Z., Butt, S. A., & Hassan, A. 2009. Corporate governance and earnings management 
an empirical evidence form Pakistani listed companies. European Journal of Scientific 
Research, 26(4), 624-638. 
Ali, A., Chen, T., & Radhakrishnan, S. 2007.Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 44, 238–286. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.006 
Al-rahahleh, Ayat 2015, Unpublished master thesis, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. 
Arsoy, A.P. & Crowther, D. 2008, Corporate governance in Turkey: reform and convergence. 
Social Responsibility Journal, 4(3), 407 – 421. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17471110810892893 
Baber, W. R., S. Kang, & K. R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting Earnings and Executive 
Compensation: The Role of Earnings Persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 
25 (2): 169-193. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00021-4 
Balsam, S., Chen, H., & Sankaraguruswamy, S. 2003. Earnings management prior to stock 
option grants. Working Paper SSRN. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.378440 
Barth, M., Landsman, W., & Lang, M. 2008.International accounting standards and accounting 
quality.Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 467. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00287.x 
Baydoun, N. Maguire, W. Ryan, N. & Willett, R. 2012, Corporate governance in five Arabian 
Gulf countries. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(1), 7 – 22. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686901311282470 
Beasley, M. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4) 443–464. 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M. & Courteau, L. 2004.The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, 
Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, 23(2) 15–35. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/aud.2004.23.2.13 
Bowen, R.M., Rajgopal, S. & Venkatachalam, M. 2003, “Accounting discretion, corporate 
governance and firm performance”, working paper, University of Washington, Seattle, 
WA 
Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L. & Terry, R.L. 1994.Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison 
Pills. Journal of Financial Economics, 35(3) 371–90. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)90038-8 
 Abbadi, Hijazi & Al-rahahleh | Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Jordan 
  
71 
Cadbury Code, 1992, “Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (The ‘Cadbury Committee’ & ‘The Code of Best Practice’), Financial 
Reporting Council.www.ecgi.org/codes/country 
Campello, M., Graham, J.R. & Harvey, C.R. 2011, “The real effects of financial constraints: 
evidence from a financial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 97 No. 3, pp. 
470-87. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.009 
Carcello, J.V., Hollingsworth, C.W., Klein, A. & Neal, T.L. 2006. Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management. 
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/paper=887512. 
Cheng, S. 2004. R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation. The Accounting Review 79(2): 
305-328. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.305 
Dahya, J. & Travlos, N.G. 2000, ‘Does the one man show pay? Theory and evidence on the dual 
CEO revisited’, European Financial Management, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 85-98. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-036X.00113 
Dechow, O.M. & Dichev, I.D. 2002. The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual 
Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review, 77(Supplement) 35-59. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeny, A. P. 1995, Detecting Earnings Management, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 70, No. 2,April, pp. 193-225. 
Epps, R. W., & Ismail, T. H. 2009.Board of directors' governance challenges and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 5(3), 390-416. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/18325910910986981 
Fischer, M., Rosenzweig, K., 1995.Attitudes of students and accounting practitioners concerning 
the ethical acceptability of earnings management. Journal of Business Ethics 14, 433-444 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00872085 
Francis, J., & Wang, D. 2004. Investor protection, auditor conservatism and earnings quality: 
Are Big 4 auditors conservative only in the United States? Working Paper, University of 
Missouri-Columbia. 
Gabrielsen, G., Jeffrey, D., & Thomas, P. 2002. Managerial ownership, information content of 
earnings, and discretionary accruals in a non-US setting. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 29, 967–988. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00457 
Gajevszky, A. 2014. The Impact of Auditor's Opinion on Earnings Management: Evidence from 
Romania. Network Intelligence Studies, No.3, PP. 61-73. 
Gaver, J. J. & K. M. Gaver. 1998. The Relation Between Nonrecurring Accounting Transactions 
and CEO Cash Compensation. The Accounting Review 73(2):235- 253. 
Ghosh, A., Marra, A., & Moon, D. 2010. Corporate boards, audit committees, and earnings 
management: pre‐and post‐SOX evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
37(9‐10), 1145-1176. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02218.x 
González, J. S., &García-Meca, E. 2014. Does corporate governance influence earnings 
management in Latin American markets? Journal of Business Ethics, 121(3), 419-440. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1700-8 
Guay, W. R., Kothari, S.P., & Watts, R. L. 1996. A Market-based Evaluation of Discretionary 
Accruals Models. Journal of Accounting Research, 34, 83-105. 
AABFJ  |  Volume 10, no. 2, 2016 
72 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2491427 
Habib, A., Uddin Bhuiyan, B., & Islam, A. 2013. Financial distress, earnings management and 
market pricing of accruals during the global financial crisis. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 
155-180. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074351311294007 
Healey, P. & Wahlen, J. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its 
Implications for Standard Settings. Accounting Horizons 13, 365-383. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365 
Hijazi, Q & Al-Thuneibat, A. 2015, Auditor’s opinions and earnings management: evidence 
from Jordan, Proceedings of The Third International Conference on Innovation Economy, 
University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, 14-15 April, 2015 
Hijazi, Qutaiba 2015, Unpublished master thesis, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan 
Huson.M., Tian, Y., Wier, H. & Wiedman, C. 2012 Managing Earnings Management: 
Compensation Committees’ Treatment of Earnings Components in CEOs’ Terminal 
years.The Accounting Review, 87(1): 231-259. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10164 
Iraya, C., Mwangi, M., & Muchoki, G. W. 2015. The effect of corporate governance practices on 
earnings management of companies listed at the Nairobi securities exchange. European 
Scientific Journal, 11(1). 
Jones, J. 1991, “Earnings management during import relief investigations”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 193-228. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2491047 
Kaplan. R. S. 1985, Comments on Paul Healy: Evidence on the Effect of Bonus Schemes on 
Accounting Procedure and Accrual Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 
109-113. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90030-8 
Khanchel,   Imen   2007,   Corporate   governance:   measurement   and   determinant   analysis. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(8), 740–760. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686900710819625 
Kothari, S., Leone, A., & Wasley, C. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163–197. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002 
Kothari, S.P., A.J. Leone, & C.E. Wasley 2002, “Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures”, Working Paper (University of Rochester). 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal determinants of external 
Finance. Journal of Finance ,52, 1131-1150 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x 
Laing, D. & Weir, C. 1999, Governance structures, size and corporate performance in UK firms, 
Management Decision, 37(5), 475-464. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251749910274234 
Lee, B.B. & B. Choi, 2002.Company size, auditor type, and earnings management. Journal of 
Forensic Accounting, 3: 27−50. 
Leuz, C., Nandab, D. & Wysocki, P. D. 2003. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An 
International Comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, No. 69: 505-527. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00121-1 
Lin, C., Ma, Y. & Su, D. 2009. Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's 
publicly listed firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 30(3), 193-209. 
 Abbadi, Hijazi & Al-rahahleh | Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Jordan 
  
73 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1447 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1463 
Liu, J. Harris, K & Omar, N. 2013, Board committees and earnings management. Corporate 
Board: Role, Duties & Composition, 9(1), 6-17  
Liu, Q., & Lu, Z. J. 2007. Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed 
companies: A tunneling perspective. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 881-906. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.07.003 
Lo, K. 2007, “Earnings management and earnings quality”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, accepted manuscript, October 8, pp. 1-17. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1007066 
Machuga, S., &Teitel, K. 2007.The effects of the Mexican Corporate Governance Code on 
quality of earnings and its components. Journal of International Accounting Research, 
6(1), 37–55. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jiar.2007.6.1.37 
Maindonald, J.  & Braun, W.J.  2010 Data Analysis and Graphics Using R: An Example Based 
Approach (Cambridge Series in Statistical and Probabilistic Mathematics) Third Edition. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139194648 
Makar, S.D., Alam, P. & Pearson, M.A. 2000, “Earnings management: when does juggling the 
numbers become fraud?”, Fraud Magazine, January/February, available at: 
www.cfenet.com 
Man, C. K., & Wong, B. 2013. Corporate governance and earnings management: A survey of 
literature. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 29(2), 391-418. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7646 
Matsumoto, D.A., 2002. Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The 
Accounting Review, 77(3): 483-514. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483 
Mohrman, M.B., 1996. The use of fixed GAAP provisions in debt contracts. Accounting 
Horizons, 10(3): 78-91. 
Patrick, E. A., Paulinus, E. C., & Nympha, A. N. 2015. The Influence of Corporate Governance 
on Earnings Management Practices: A Study of Some Selected Quoted Companies in 
Nigeria. American Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 
482-493 
Peasnell, K., Pope, P. & Young, S. 2000. Accrual Management to Meet Earnings Targets: UK 
Evidence Pre- and Post-Cadbury. The British Accounting Review, 32(4) 415–445. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/bare.2000.0134 
Prior, D., Surroca, J., &Tribo, J. 2008. Are socially responsible managers really ethical? 
Exploring the relationship between earnings management and corporate social 
responsibility. Corporate Governance, 16(3), 160–177. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00678.x 
Prommin, P., Jumreornvong, S., & Jiraporn, P. 2012.Liquidity, ownership structure, and 
corporate governance. Working paper. Pennsylvania State University, School of Graduate 
Professional Studies. 
Prommin, P., Jumreornvong, S., & Jiraporn, P. 2014. The effect of corporate governance on 
stock liquidity: The case of Thailand. International Review of Economics & Finance, 32, 
132-142. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.011 
AABFJ  |  Volume 10, no. 2, 2016 
74 
Rakin, M. Stanton,S. McGowan,S. Ferlauto,K. & Tilling, M. 2012. Contemporary Issues in 
Accounting, 1st Edition, Wiley 
Ramachandran, J., Ngete, Z. A., Subramanian, R., & Sambasivan, M. 2015. Dose Corporate 
Governance Influence Earnings Management? Evadne From Singapore. Proceedings of 
the Australian Academy of Business and Social Sciences Conference. 
Roe, M. 1991. A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance. Columbia Law Review, 91(1) 
10–67. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1122856 
Roychowdhury, S. 2006.Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, No. 42,PP. 335–370. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002 
Ruigrok, W., S. Peck, et al. 2006."The Determinants and Effects of Board Nomination 
Committees." Journal of Management & Governance, 10(2): 119-119. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10997-006-0001-3 
Sanchez-Ballesta, J., & Garcia-Meca, E. 2007.Ownership structure, discretionary accruals and 
the informativeness of earnings. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 
677–691. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00596.x 
Sawicki, J. 2009. Corporate governance and dividend policy in Southeast Asia pre- and post-
crisis. The European Journal of Finance, 15, 211–230. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518470802604440 
Sheikh, N. Wang, Z. & Khan, S. 2013, The impact of internal attributes of corporate governance 
on firm performance. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 23(1), 38-55. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/10569211311301420 
Swastika, D. L. T. 2013. Corporate governance, firm size, and earning management: Evidence in 
Indonesia stock exchange. IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF), 10(4), 
77-82. 
Tauringana,V & Arfifa,G 2013, The Relative importance of working capital management and its   
components   to   SMEs   profitability,   Journal   of   Small   Business   and   Enterprise 
Development, 20(3). 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JSBED-12-2011-0029 
Udomsirikul, P., Jumreornvong, S., & Jiraporn, P. 2011. Liquidity and capital structure: The cast 
of Thailand. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 21, 106–117. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2010.12.008 
Wang, D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 44(3), 619–656. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00213.x 
Wartfield, T., Wild, J., & Wild, K. 1995.Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and 
informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61–91. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)00393-J 
Watts, R. & J. Zimmerman, 1986.Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
USA: Prentice-Hall. 
Weir, C. & Laing, D. 2001, ‘Governance structures, director independence and corporate 
performance in the UK’, European Business Review, Vol. 13 No. 2, p. 86. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09555340110385254 
Wernerfelt, Birger 1986, The Relation Between Market Share and Profitability, Journal of 
Business strategy, 6(4),67-74 
 Abbadi, Hijazi & Al-rahahleh | Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Jordan 
  
75 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb039133 
White, G.T., Sondhi, A.C. & Fried, D. 2003, The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements, 
Wiley, New York, NY. 
Williamson, O. 1981. The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 19(4) 1537–1568. 
Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N. & DaDalt, P.J. 2003. Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Roles of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 9 295–316. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00006-8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
